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NOTES
EDUCATION OF HANDICAPPED
CHILDREN: THE IEP PROCESS AND THE
SEARCH FOR AN APPROPRIATE
EDUCATION
"[I]t is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to
succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education."1
This statement by Chief Justice Earl Warren, made in the
landmark decision of Brown v. Board of Education,2 contemplates
that black students schooled in segregated facilities would view
themselves to be inferior members of the community.3 Although
the veracity of the statement also is evident regarding the school-
ing of handicapped children, these children for many years had
been denied meaningful educational opportunities.' Indeed, most
handicapped children, whose physical and mental impairments
made formal education essential to their successful participation in
society,5 were either excluded from the mainstream of public edu-
cation or placed in programs ill-suited to their educational needs.'
Ultimately, however, these exclusionary practices were chal-
lenged successfully.7 The courts, cognizant of the advances in diag-
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
2 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3 Id. at 493.
See S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1 Sess. 8, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 1425, 1432. In 1975, the Bureau of Education for Handicapped Children reported that
eight million children in America were handicapped and in need of special education. Id.
Less than half of these children were receiving an appropriate education. Another 1.75 mil-
lion were receiving no education at all. Id.
5 THE PRESIDENT'S CoMMITTEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION, [1969] ANNUAL REPORT 17
(cited in Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 296
n.50 (E.D. Pa. 1972)). Three-fourths of all mentally retarded children could become self-
supporting if given the appropriate education. Another 10 to 15% could become partially
self-supporting. Id.
0 See Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Pub. Welfare, 459 F. Supp. 30, 48-49
(E.D. Pa. 1978) (Broderick, J., dissenting).
7 See, e.g., Hairston v. Drosick, 423 F. Supp. 180, 184 (S.D.W. Va. 1976); Taylor v.
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nostic and instructional procedures and methods used in educating
handicapped children,8 directed state education departments to re-
vise their special education programs to meet the educational
needs of such children.9 Compliance with judicial mandates proved
problematic, however, since states frequently lacked the resources
to implement fully the required special education programs. 10 Par-
tially because of this funding problem, Congress enacted the Edu-
cation for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA),11 which pro-
vides that states may obtain monies from the federal government
sufficient to ensure that a "free appropriate public education" is
provided to all handicapped children.12
Maryland School for the Blind, 409 F. Supp. 148, 152 (D. Md.), afl'd mem., 542 F.2d 1169
(1976); Frederick L. v. Thomas, 408 F. Supp. 832, 840-41 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Fialkowski v.
Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946, 959 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Panitch v. Wisconsin, 371 F. Supp. 955, 959-
60 (E.D. Wis. 1974); Lebanks v. Spears, 60 F.R.D. 135, 153 (E.D. La. 1973); Mills v. Board of
Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 878 (D.D.C. 1972); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v.
Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 302 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Harrison v. Michigan, 350 F. Supp.
846, 849 (E.D. Mich. 1972); In re Jessup, 85 Misc. 2d 575, 580, 379 N.Y.S.2d 626, 632 (Fam-
ily Ct. N.Y. County 1975).
' See generally Haggerty & Sacks, Education of the Handicapped: Towards a Defini-
tion of an Appropriate Education, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 961, 966-73 (1977).
1 See, e.g., Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 878-83 (D.D.C. 1972). See also
Weintraub & Abeson, Appropriate Education for All Handicapped Children: A Growing
Issue, 23 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1037, 1045-58 (1972).
10 S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1425, 1432. Courts have refused to impose expenditure requirements based upon the
needs of handicapped children. See McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 329 (N.D. Ill.
1968), aff'd sub nom. McInnis v. Oglivie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969). Rather, the courts have per-
mitted the limitation of special education expenditures in accordance with the financial con-
straints of the various school districts. E.g., McMillan v. Board of Educ., 430 F.2d 1145,
1149 (2d Cir. 1970).
" Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1232, 1401, 1405,
1406, 1411-1420, 1453 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)). The EAHCA is the latest in a series of
legislative enactments providing for the needs of handicapped children. In 1966, Congress
established the Bureau for Education and Training of the Handicapped, pursuant to Title
VI, section 609, of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, Pub. L. No. 89-750, 80
Stat. 1191, 1208 (1966). The Bureau's principal responsibility was to conduct and promote
special education research. See id. In 1970, Congress amended the Elementary and Secon-
dary Education Act to repeal Title VI and create the Education of the Handicapped Act,
Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 121, 175 (1970). See S. REP. No. 634, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 90,
reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2768, 2832-33. This amendment contained
a special education funding mechanism. Id. In 1974, Congress passed another amendment,
Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 484 (1974), which embraced the theory of mainstreaming as the
most preferred educational process. See notes 89 & 90 and accompanying text infra. See
generally S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-7, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1425, 1429-31.
12 See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (1976). The EAHCA is an enabling act which provides funds
-to qualifying states to help them meet the expense of educating handicapped children. See
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The elements of an appropriate education, however, are not
specified in the EAHCA.13 Instead, recognizing that the needs of
each handicapped child are unique and that no one program can
be appropriate for all, Congress mandated the implementation of a
process entailing (1) the identification of the unique needs of each
child,14 and (2) the development of a program capable of meeting
those needs in the least restricted environment. 15
Notwithstanding the fact that the EAHCA focuses upon a pro-
cess for achieving an appropriate education rather than upon a
substantive definition of the term, some courts, which are the final
arbiters of the appropriateness of educational programs,1 6 have ex-
pressed dismay over the absence of substantive guidelines.17 This
Note will demonstrate that the confusion as to what constitutes an
appropriate education is not the result of a lack of substantive def-
inition, but follows from the courts' misplaced emphasis upon the
program chosen rather than upon the process used to develop such
a program.1 8 Toward this end, the Note will survey those cases
which first recognized the right of handicapped children to receive
an appropriate education." Next, the evolution of educational phi-
losophies concerning the appropriateness of an educational pro-
gram, as well as the approach embodied in the EAHCA, will be
Loughran v. Flanders, 470 F. Supp. 110, 113 (D. Conn. 1979); Eberle v. Board of Pub. Educ.,
444 F. Supp. 41, 43 (D. Pa. 1977), aff'd mem., 582 F.2d 1274 (3d Cir. 1978). Notably, the Act
does not require the federal government to meet all the costs of special education. Rather,
the EAHCA is intended merely to supplement state funds expended for the identification,
evaluation, and education of all handicapped children. See S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2, 3, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1425, 1426-27.
13 See Congressional Declaration of Purpose, Pub. L. No. 91-230, § 601(c), 84 Stat. 175
(1970), as amended by Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 3(a), 89 Stat. 774, 775 (1975).
" 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(19), 1414(a)(1)(A) (1976).
15 Id. § 1401(19); 34 C.F.R. § 300.132 (1981).
16 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1976). The federal district courts have jurisdiction over
all claims of noncompliance with EAHCA requirements. Id. § 1415(e)(4). Nevertheless, the
decisions of state and local authorities are "entitled to considerable deference." Stuart v.
Nappi, 443 F. Supp. 1235, 1243-44 (D. Conn. 1978); see Mrs. A.J. v. Special School Dist. No.
1, 478 F. Supp. 418, 431-32 (D. Minn. 1979).
1 See Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269, 281 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49
U.S.L.W. 3954 (U.S. June 23, 1981); Rowley v. Board of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528, 533-34
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 632 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3334
(U.S. Nov. 2, 1981); Note, Enforcing the Right to an "Appropriate" Education: The Educa-
tion for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 92 HARv. L. REv. 1103, 1125-27 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Appropriate Education]; Haggerty & Sacks, supra note 8, at
988-94.
18 See notes 176-214 and accompanying text infra.
19 See notes 32-72 and accompanying text infra.
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examined."0 The Note will then outline the process set forth in the
EAHCA for ensuring that an appropriate education is provided for
handicapped children, 21 and critique New York State's implemen-
tation of such process. 22 Finally, upon considering several judicial
tests,23 the Note will suggest an alternative approach whereby the
appropriateness of a contested educational process may be
ascertained.24
DEVELOPMENT OF THE EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS OF HANDICAPPED
CHILDREN
Education, long regarded as a principal governmental func-
tion,2 5 generally has not been deemed by the courts to be constitu-
tionally mandated.26 Rather, the judiciary has viewed the power to
devise educational programs as within the discretion of the state,
provided some rational basis for the state's decisions can be
shown. 7 Consequently, state legislation which excluded handi-
capped children from public schools often was sanctioned.28 Al-
though a few courts suggested that handicapped children com-
prised a suspect class 29 that could not be excluded from public
20 See notes 73-93 and accompanying text infra.
21 See notes 94-129 and accompanying text infra.
21 See notes 130-172 and accompanying text infra.
2 See notes 173-207 and accompanying text infra.
24 See notes 208-218 and accompanying text infra.
25 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972) ("Providing public schools ranks at
the very apex of the fumction of a State"); id. at 238-39 (White, J., concurring); Abington
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); Illinois ex rel.
McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
26 See Krass, The Right to Public Education for Handicapped Children: A Primer for
the New Advocate, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1016, 1043.
217 See Cuyahoga County Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Essex, 411 F. Supp. 46, 50
(N.D. Ohio 1976); Stanton v. Sequoia Union High School Dist., 408 F. Supp. 502, 517 (N.D.
Cal. 1976). When public education is offered it must not be violative of the equal protection
clause. Bauza v. Morales Carrion, 578 F.2d 447, 451 (1st Cir. 1978); see Natonabah v. Board
of Edue., 355 F. Supp. 716, 724 (D.N.M. 1973); Harrison v. Michigan, 350 F. Supp. 846, 848
(E.D. Mich. 1972); Blaine v. Board of Educ., 502 P.2d 693, 696-97 (Kan. 1972).
28 E.g., Department of Pub. Welfare v. Haas, 15 IlM. 2d 204, 154 N.E.2d 265, 270 (1958);
Watson v. City of Cambridge, 157 Mass. 651, 32 N.E. 864, 864-65 (1893).
29 See Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946, 958-59 (E.D. Pa. 1975); In re G.H., 218
N.W.2d 441, 446-47 (N.D. 1974); Burgdorf & Burgdorf, Jr., A History of Unequal Treat-
ment: The Qualifications of Handicapped Persons as a "Suspect Class" Under the Equal
Protection Clause, 15 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 855 (1975). Observing that handicapped chil-
dren could be considered a suspect class, the Fialkowski court cited the test espoused by the
Supreme Court in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973),
which defined a suspect class as "[a] class ... saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to
such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
[Vol. 56:81
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schools absent a compelling state interest,30 this approach was not
widely accepted.",
Ultimately, however, in Pennsylvania Association for Re-
tarded Children v. Pennsylvania,32 (PARC), and Mills v. Board of
Education,3 two landmark federal district court cases,34 the right
to an education for handicapped children was grounded success-
fully upon the federal constitution.3 5 In these cases, and their prog-
eny, advocates for handicapped children established that exclu-
sionary and inappropriate education practices improperly deprived
handicapped children of their rights under the fifth and fourteenth
amendments."
In PARC, a class action was brought on behalf of all mentally
retarded children between the ages of 6 and 21 who were excluded
from public education by statutes of the Commonwealth of Penn-
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political pro-
cess." Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp. at 958-59 (quoting San Antonio Independent
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28).
30 Accord, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (statutes which penalize the
exercise of a constitutionally protected right are subject to strict judicial scrutiny). The
strict judicial scrutiny standard is used to test state action which "impermissibly interferes
with tht exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a sus-
pect class," Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (footnotes
omitted), and is not satisfied absent a compelling state interest. See, e.g., Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305 (1978). See generally Barrett, Judicial Supervision
of Legislative Classifications-A More Modest Role for Equal Protection?, 1976 B.Y.U.L.
REV. 89.
31 E.g., Doe v. Laconia Supervisory Union, 396 F. Supp. 1291, 1296 (D.N.H. 1975). The
Doe court relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677 (1973). In Frontiero, Justice Brennan indicated that mere performance peculiarities
cannot create a suspect class. Id. at 686. At least one commentator, however, has stated that
Justice Brennan's remarks were only dictum and are not justifiable in light of the require-
ments for a suspect class enunciated by the Court. Krass, supra note 26, at 1038-40. Other
courts have suggested a middle-tier analysis for classifications based upon handicapping
conditions. See N.Y.S. Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 466 F. Supp. 487, 504
(E.D.N.Y. 1979); Doe v. Colautti, 454 F. Supp. 621, 632 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Frederick L. v.
Thomas, 408 F. Supp. 832, 836 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Gammon, Equal Protection of the Law and
San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 11 VAL. U.L. REv. 435, 463 (1977);
McClung, "Do Handicapped Children Have a Legal Right to a Minimally Adequate Edu-
cation?," 3 J.L. & EDUC. 153, 162-66 (1974).
31 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
13 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
34 S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & An.
NEWS 1425, 1430. The PARC and Mills decisions were the first in "a series of landmark
court cases establishing in law the right to education for all handicapped children." Id.
35 See id.
36 Id.
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sylvania. 7 The plaintiffs attacked these statutes as unconstitu-
tional, alleging that they violated the due process and equal pro-
tection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.3 8 Respecting their
due process claim, the plaintiffs asserted that before a child could
be labeled as retarded, and subsequently have his educational
placement changed, he must be given notice and an opportunity to
be heard. 9 The plaintiffs further asserted that the contested Penn-
sylvania statutes "arbitrarily and capriciously" denied an educa-
tion to handicapped children.40 In connection with their equal pro-
tection claim, the plaintiffs alleged that the statutes at issue, which
presupposed "that certain retarded children are uneducable and
untrainable . .. [lacked] a rational basis in fact."41
Before these allegations were tried, however, the plaintiffs and
the defendant Commonwealth of Pennsylvania entered into several
agreements.42 Although the unconstitutionality of the contested
statutes was not conceded in these agreements,43 Pennsylvania did
accede to the plaintiffs' demand that it provide preexclusion hear-
ings to children scheduled to be removed from public education
programs.44 The state also agreed to "provide a program of educa-
tion and training appropriate to the capacities of" handicapped
children.45
In assessing whether it had subject matter jurisdiction over
the settled controversy, '6 the PARC court reviewed the plaintiffs'
11 343 F. Supp. 279, 281-83 (E.D. Pa. 1972). Pursuant to the contested statutes, chil-
dren certified as "uneducable and untrainable," and children of mental age of less than 5
years, were denied a public education. Id.; see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 13-304, 13-1375.
Significantly, the statutes excluded over 70,000 children from "any public education services
in schools, home or.day care or other community facilities, or state residential institutions."
343 F. Supp. at 296 (emphasis in original). See generally Recent Developments, PARC v.
Pennsylvania, 18 VILL. L. REV. 277, 277-88 (1972).
38 343 F. Supp. at 283.
39 Id.
4o Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 285. For a discussion of the PARC settlement agreements, see Kuriloff, True,
Kirp & Buss, Legal Reform and Educational Change: The Pennsylvania Case, 41 ExCEn-
TIONAL CHILDREN 35 (1974). See also Shapp, The Right to an Education for the Retarded in
Pennsylvania, 23 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1085, 1085 (1972).
41 343 F. Supp. at 285.
'" Id. at 284-85.
41 Id. at 285.
" Id. at 293-97. A school district affected by the consent agreement had attacked the
court's jurisdiction, asserting the absence of a controversy. Id. at 290-91. The court found
that Pennsylvania's refusal to concede the unconstitutionality of its statutes created a justi-
ciable controversy. Id. at 291.
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due process and equal protection allegations. The court reasoned
that "the stigma which our society . . . attaches to the label of
mental retardation, '47 as well as the educability of retarded chil-
dren, 4 8 evinced the questionable constitutionality of the challenged
statutes. 49 Upon further noting that the settlement agreements
reached by the plaintiffs and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
were "fair and reasonable," 50 the court issued the injunctions nec-
essary to impose these agreements upon the defendant Pennsylva-
nia school districts. 1
Decided shortly after PARC, Mills v. Board of Education52
also invited a class action brought on behalf of handicapped chil-
dren excluded from a public education.5 3 No questions of fact were
presented, because the Mills defendants previously had admitted
in a consent order that they had failed to provide the plaintiffs and
their class with a "publicly supported education" as required by a
District of Columbia statute." The defendants also conceded that
they had failed to provide "constitutionally adequate" hearings for
handicapped children.5 Notwithstanding these admissions, the de-
fendants failed to comply with the consent order.5 6 In defense of
their failure to comply, the defendants asserted that the District of
Columbia could not afford to provide an education for the mem-
bers of the plaintiffs' class."7 Rejecting this argument, the Mills
47 Id. at 293.
" Id. at 296-97. Notably, five leading experts in the field of education for handicapped
children testified in PARC that all mentally retarded children can benefit from an educa-
tion. Id. at 296 & n.49; see Casey, The Supreme Court and the Suspect Class, 40 ExcEP-
TIONAL CHILDREN 119, 124 (1973).
"1 343 F. Supp. 279, 295, 297 (E.D. Pa. 1972). Although the PARC court found that the
plaintiffs had presented colorable constitutional claims, it did not render a judgment as to
the constitutionality of the contested statutes. See id.
10 Id. at 302. The court viewed Pennsylvania's willingness to enter the agreement as an
"intelligent response to overwhelming evidence against their position." Id. at 291. Indeed,
the negative publicity generated by the litigation and the potential impact of an adverse
holding led the state to enter a detailed and extensive consent agreement. See Kuriloff,
True, Kirp & Buss, supra note 42, at 36-37. See also Shapp, supra note 42, at 1085 (the
governor of Pennsylvania who authorized the consent agreement "welcomed rather than
challenged the [PARC] suit").
51 343 F. Supp. 279, 302 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
62 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
53 Id. at 868. The plaintiff class in Mills included mentally retarded and hyperactive
children, and children with behavioral problems. Id.
4 Id. at 871.
55 Id.
11 Id. at 872.
57 Id. at 875.
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court reasoned that the defendants were "required by the Consti-
tution of the United States . . . to provide a publicly-supported
education" to handicapped children.5 8 Moreover, the court stated
that the District of Columbia's interest in educating its children
outweighed its interest in preserving its financial resources.59 Con-
sequently, the court held that the District should distribute its
funds in an equitable manner sufficient to ensure that no child
would be excluded from the educational system. 0
Further insight into the right-to-education issue, albeit not in
the context of the education of handicapped children, was forth-
coming in two Supreme Court cases. In San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez,"1 an action was brought on behalf of
a class of children whose families resided in school districts having
low property tax bases.2 The plaintiff class in San Antonio alleged
that Texas' educational funding scheme, which relied in part upon
local property taxes, created disparities in per pupil expenditures,
and therefore, was violative of the equal protection clause of the
constitution.6
Rejecting the plaintiff's equal protection argument, the Su-
preme Court held that the constitution does not afford a funda-
mental right to education. 4 The Court thereupon reasoned that
because the contested funding statute was rationally related to a
legitimate state purpose, it was permissible. 5 Notwithstanding
such holding, however, the San Antonio Court intimated that
there might be a constitutional duty to provide citizens with an
education sufficient to enable them to participate in the political
58 Id. at 876.
" Id. In support of its holding, the Mills court analogized the rights of handicapped
children to those of welfare recipients. Id.; see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266 (1970)
(state's interest in preventing wrongful termination of benefits outweighs fiscal interests).
60 348 F. Supp. 866, 876 (D.D.C. 1972). Significantly, the Mills court ordered that
"among the alternative programs of education, placement in a regular public school class
with appropriate ancillary services is preferable to placement in a special school class." Id.
at 880.
61 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
02 Id. at 4-6.
6 Id. at 15-16.
64 Id. at 34-36. A statute which impinges upon a fundamental right will be subjected to
strict judicial scrutiny. Id. at 29; see Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375-76 (1971);
Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 638 (1969); note 30 supra. A statute which does not impinge upon a fundamental right
will be upheld if it rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose. 411 U.S. at 17; e.g., McGin-
nis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270 (1973).
65 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973).
[Vol. 56:81
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process.66
The Supreme Court again addressed the right to education is-
sue in Lau v. Nichols.6 7 In Lau, non-English speaking students
of Chinese ancestry sought to redress the "unequal educational
opportunities" engendered by California's public school system,
which, inter alia, did not mandate bilingual instruction." Al-
though the Court found for the plaintiffs, it did not reach their
equal protection clause theory. 9 Rather, upon stating that the pro-
vision of English instruction to non-English speaking children "ef-
fectively foreclosed [them] from any meaningful education, '7' and
would "make a mockery of public education, 7 1 the Court held that
such functional discrimination was violative of section 601 of the
Civil Rights Act. 2
EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHIES INFLUENCING THE EAHCA
Upon illumination of the plight of handicapped children by
the comprehensive PARC and Mills decisions, and upon the Su-
preme Court's decisions in San Antonio and Lau, numerous courts
held that the states must provide for the education of handicapped
children.7 3 In compliance with this judicial initiative, all states
"6 Id. at 37. The decision in San Antonio was of immediate importance to the advocates
of handicapped children. Prior to San Antonio, some courts had viewed education as a fun-
damental interest and had struck down statutes which discriminated against the handi-
capped or other minorities. See N.Y.S. Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F.
Supp. 752, 763 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Graham v. Knutzen, 351 F. Supp. 642, 664 (D. Neb. 1972);
Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280, 282-85 (W.D. Tex.
1971); Ordway v. Hargraves, 323 F. Supp. 1155, 1158 (D. Mass. 1971); Serrano v. Priest, 5
Cal. 3d 584, 589, 487 P.2d 1241, 1244, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 604 (1971). After San Antonio,
however, classifications of handicapped children which resulted in their exclusion from pub-
lic education were upheld. See Cuyahoga County Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Essex, 411
F. Supp. 46, 50 (N.D. Ohio 1976); cf. Stock v. Texas Catholic Interscholastic League, 364
F. Supp. 362, 365-66 (N.D. Tex. 1973) (no fundamental right to participate in school ac-
tivities).
67 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
es Id. at 564-65. The Lau Court noted the existence of several educational alternatives:
"[t]eaching English to the students of Chinese ancestry who do not speak the language is
one choice. Giving instructions to this group in Chinese is another. There may be others."
Id. at 565.
69 Id. at 566.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 568-69.
7 See S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. &
An. NEWS 1425, 1431.
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eventually enacted special education statutes. 74 Unfortunately,
however, these statutes did not substantially improve the educa-
tion of handicapped children.75 Several factors contributed to the
inadequacies of state-mandated special education programs, in-
cluding an insufficiency of funds as well as a dearth of adequately
trained personnel. 7 Additionally, the absence of a uniform system
of identification prevented many handicapped children from re-
ceiving any benefit from legislation directed specifically at them.7
Perhaps the most significant obstacle to advancements in the
area of special education was the adherence, by educators, to an
ineffective educational approach-the segregation of educationally
exceptional children into "special" classrooms comprised of other
children identified as having the same handicap. 8 Although this
approach presupposed that the exceptional child would progress
most satisfactorily once removed from the inappropriate and intel-
lectually frustrating surroundings of the normal classroom, 79 it pos-
" Shortly after the PARC and Mills decisions were rendered, a clear trend developed:
Twenty-four states plus the District of Columbia enacted laws for the education of
the handicapped by 1973, half of those laws being enacted in 1972. Prior to 1960,
only three states had enacted special education laws and seven more states en-
acted laws in the 1960's. Now [in 1978] all states have enacted special education
laws....
Miller & Miller, The Handicapped Child's Civil Right as it Relates to the "Least Restric-
tive Environment" and Appropriate Mainstreaming, 54 IND. L.J. 1, 13-14 (1978) (footnotes
omitted).
" Accord, Kirp, Buss & Kuriloff, Legal Reform of Special Education: Empirical Stud-
ies and Procedural Proposals, 62 CALIF. L. REy. 40, 58-82 (1974).
"I See S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1425, 1432; Weintraub & Abeson, supra note 9, at 1049-55.
" See S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 1425, 1432.
78 Handicapped students were segregated in various ways. Severely handicapped chil-
dren, such as the profoundly retarded, often were sent to state institutions. "Education" in
these institutions consisted mainly of custodial care. Those children with normal intelli-
gence but with sensory impairments typically were given vocational training. S. LARSEN &
M. POPLIN, METHODS FOR EDUCATING THE HANDICAPPED: AN INDMDUALIZED EDUCATIONAL
PROGRAM APPROACH 4 (1980).
79 J. McCARTHY, Learning Disabilities: Where Have We Been? Where Are We Going?
Selected Convention Papers, Council for Exceptional Children Convention 33-39 (1969), in
D. HAMMILL & N. BARTEL, EDUCATIONAL PERSPECTIVES IN LEARNING DISABILITIES 10 (1971);
Burton & Hirshoren, The Education of Severely and Profoundly Retarded Children: Are
We Sacrificing the Child to the Concept?, 45 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 598, 599 (1979); Mar-
tin, Individualism and Behaviorism as Future Trends in Educating Handicapped Chil-
dren, 38 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 517, 518-19 (1972). It was believed by many educators that
the regular classroom was ill-equipped to meet the individual needs of handicapped children
and that such children needed to be shielded from the pressures of the regular classroom.
Burton & Hirshoren, supra, at 599. It was also believed that specially trained teachers work-
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sessed several deficiencies. First, studies indicated that segregation
did not appreciably improve the student's learning capacity.80 Con-
versely, the integration of such students into the traditional class-
room was shown to improve their academic performance substan-
tially.8 - Second, while segregation served to alleviate the
disturbances and disruptions sometimes instigated by handicapped
children in the regular classroom,82 children placed in integrated
classes tended to be more self-aware and better adjusted than
those who were isolated in homogeneous classes. 83 Third, place-
ment of handicapped children in segregated classes exacerbated
ing with homogeneously grouped classes would be better able to effect a meaningful educa-
tion. S. LARSEN & M. POPLIN, supra note 78, at 4.
80 S. KIRK, EDUCATING EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 199 (2d ed. 1972); Kirp, Schools as Sort-
ers: The Constitutional and Policy Implications of Student Classification, 121 U. PA. L.
REV. 705, 718, 728 (1973). Although many eminent educators wpre convinced that segregated
classes for handicapped children were undesirable, school administrators were reluctant to
depart from the traditional approach. Additionally, regular classroom teachers viewed the
integration of handicapped pupils with normal students as a threat to the stability of their
classrooms. Hudson, Graham & Warner, Mainstreaming: An Examination of the Attitudes
and Needs of Regular Classroom Teachers, 2 LEARNING DISABILITY Q. 58, 60 (1979).
81 S. KIRK, supra note 80, at 199-201.
82 Dybwad, Avoiding Misconceptions of Mainstreaming, the Least Restrictive Envi-
ronment, and Normalization, 47 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 85, 86 (1980). The rapid increase in
the number of special education classes in the 1960's was not a response to meet the needs
of handicapped children, but rather an expedient measure to remove those children from
the traditional classroom, where they were viewed as inhibiting the education of normal
children. Christoplos & Renz, A Critical Examination of Special Education Programs, 3 J.
SPECIAL EDuc. 371, 373 (1969). Segregation into special education classes often was used as a
means to reduce the problems of the regular classroom teacher. See Lora v. Board of Educ.,
456 F. Supp. 1211, 1220 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), vacated and remanded, 623 F.2d 248, 249 (2d Cir.
1980). Consequently, children whose cultural or other differences created problems were re-
moved from the regular classroom and placed into special education classes where the in-
structional level of the class and the expectations of the teachers led to achievement far
below their capabilities. See Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 469-72 (D.D.C. 1967),
aff'd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969); S. KIRK, supra note 80, at
201. Indeed, those students to be segregated usually were selected pursuant to standardized
intelligence tests. Since these tests were culturally and racially biased to white middli-class
children, a disproportionate number of minority children, who lacked comparable exper-
iences, were misclassified. Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 1211, 1220, 1243 (E.D.N.Y.
1978), vacated and remanded, 623 F.2d 248, 249 (2d Cir. 1930); P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp.
1306, 1308-09, 1314 (N.D. Cal. 1972), afl'd per curiam, 502 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1974); Hobson
v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 407, 422-46, 479 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Smuck v. Hob-
son, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969); see S. KIRK, supra note 80, at 200; Kirp, Buss & Kuriloff,
supra note 75, at 49-50.
83 See generally Sontag, Certo & Button, On a Distinction Between the Education of
the Severely and Profoundly Handicapped and a Doctrine of Limitations, 45 EXCEPTIONAL
CHILDREN 604, 606 (1979).
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their stigmatization. 4
Dissatisfaction with the "total segregation" approach led edu-
cators to look to alternative theories of education. Indeed, the rise
of individualism and behavioralism as educational philosophies
was met with great enthusiasm by advocates of special education."5
Influenced by the soundness of these teaching approaches, those
responsible for administering special education programs shifted
their emphasis from merely planning for the child according to his
handicap, to specifically providing for the child according to his
unique needs.88
A main tenet of such shift in emphasis was the principle of
"normalization," which contemplates that handicapped children
must learn to deal with other nonhandicapped children and, more
importantly, to function in society. 7 Educators believed that the
best way to teach the adaptive skills necessary to cope in society,
namely, to normalize the handicapped child, was to provide an ed-
11 E.g., Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279,
293-95 (E.D. Pa. 1972). The PARC court found that some parents of retarded children lik-
ened stigmatization to a "'sentence of death.' "Id. at 295. Unfortunately, the stigmatization
of handicapped children has persisted despite diligent efforts to educate the public as to its
devastating effects. In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 668 & n.72, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Lora v.
Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 1211, 1220 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), vacated and remanded, 623 F.2d
248 (2d Cir. 1980); cf. Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Pub. Welfare, 459 F. Supp.
30, 43 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (stigma attaches to "institutional commitment"), rev'd on other
grounds, 442 U.S. 640 (1979).
85 Behaviorism is a planning discipline which focuses upon desired behaviors, or "out-
puts." Martin, supra note 79, at 521-22. The theories of behavioralism and individualism
dictate that educators view their students from a behavioral standpoint, not merely in ac-
cordance with handicapping conditions. S. KIRK, From Labels to Action, Selected Papers on
Learning Disabilities: International Approaches to Learning Disabilities of Children and
Adults, THIRD ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR CHILDREN wITH LEARNING
DISABILITIES, 36-44 (1966), in D. HAMMILL & N. BARTEL, EDUCATIONAL PERSPECTIVES IN
LEARNING DISABILITIES 304 (1971).
88 See S. LARSEN & M. POPLIN, supra note 78, at 5. The movement to banish segregated
homogeneous education for handicapped children was vastly enhanced by an article au-
thored by Lloyd M. Dunn, an esteemed authority in the special education field. Mr. Dunn,
for many years a zealous supporter of special education classes, wrote that "[m]uch of our
past and present practices are morally and educationally wrong .... [A] large proportion of
this so called special education in its present form is obsolete and unjustifiable from the
point of view of the pupils so placed." Dunn, Special Education for the Mildly Re-
tarded-Is Much of It Justifiable?, 35 ExCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 5, 5-6 (1968).
87 Burton & Hirshoren, supra note 79, at 599. One of the paramount goals of special
education is the optimization of a child's ability to be an active participant in society.
"[Tihis has been termed normalization, that is, we must ensure through appropriate oppor-
tunities and educational experiences that individuals will enjoy the best quality of life avail-
able to them within the limitations imposed by their handicaps." Id. (emphasis in original);
see note 96 infra.
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ucation in as conventional milieu as possible."8 Hence, attention
was focused upon assimilating or "mainstreaming"' handicapped
children into regular classrooms, where both social and academic
skills could be developed.90
Despite the fact that educators favored the normalization of
handicapped children, limited financial resources prevented states
from achieving this end.' 1 Although the developments in educa-
tional methodology had made effective education for handicapped
children possible, most handicapped children in the United States
continued to be denied an appropriate education.2 It was in light
of such concern that Congress enacted the Education for All Hand-
icapped Children Act.'3
Dybwad, supra note 82, at 87.
,Mainstreaming has been defined as:
(1) an attitudinal system that reinforces the position that all children can learn
when attention is given to individual learning styles, learning rates, and varied
content; (2) a management system that allows for optional routes to goal achieve-
ment; and (3) an organizational support system that provides for the educational
needs of all children.
Miller & Miller, supra note 74, at 25 n.86 (quoting Monaco, Mainstreaming, Who?, 13 Sci.
& CHILDREN 11 (1976)). Notably, the Board of Regents for the State of New York, recogniz-
ing the importance of- mainstreaming, has stated that "[t]he quality of many publicly oper-
ated or supported educational programs is related to the degree to which children with
handicapping conditions are grouped or otherwise combined effectively with other children
in the mainstream of our schools and society." N.Y. STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, THE
EDUCATION OF CHILDREN wTH HANDICAPPING CONDIONS 6 (1973).
90 See Hoben, Toward Integration in the Mainstream, 47 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 100,
100 (1980). Senator Stafford has indicated that the best way to teach the adaptive skills that
are necessary to cope in society is to provide an education in as normal an environment as
possible. Stafford, Education for the Handicapped: A Senator's Perspective, 3 VT. L. Rv.
71, 76 (1978). There are some commentators, however, who doubt that mainstreaming is
effective. They suggest that nonhandicapped children will resent the extra attention af-
forded handicapped pupils. These commentators conclude that such resentment, coupled
with misunderstanding and fear, could result in stigmatization and functional segregation
more damaging than a separate class would create. See Burton & Hirshoren, supra note 79,
at 601; Large, Special Problems of the Deaf Under the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act of 1975, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 213, 244-48 (1980). The majority of available evi-
dence, however, indicates that mainstreamed children are not stigmatized more than those
children placed in segregated classrooms. Sontag, Certo & Button, supra note 83, at 611
(citing J. GOTTLmB, PLACEMENT IN THE LEAST REsTRicTIVE ENVIRONMENT 53 (1978)).
91 S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Seas. 7, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1425, 1431.
92 See Congressional Declaration of Purpose, Pub. L. No. 91-230, § 601(c), 84 Stat. 175
(1970), as amended by Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 3(a), 89 Stat. 774-75 (1975).
93 Id.
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THE EAHCA AND THE FEDERAL REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE IEP
Although the EAHCA patently is a special education funding
vehicle,"4 the conditions precedent to EAHCA assistance' clearly
evince a more subtle albeit paramount objective: the normalization
of handicapped children." In accordance with such mandate,
states seeking EAHCA financial assistance must have in force "a
policy that assures all handicapped children the right to a free ap-
propriate public education. '9 7 Indeed, the obtainmebt of EAHCA
funding is conditioned upon submission to the Commissioner of
Education a state plan guaranteeing, inter alia, that federal mon-
" Id. In setting forth the declaration of purpose, Congress stated:
(8) State and local educational agencies have a responsibility to provide education
for all handicapped children, but present financial resources are inadequate to
meet the special educational needs of handicapped children ....
(c) It is the purpose of this Act ... to assist States and localities to provide for
the education of all handicapped children ....
Id.; see 20 U.S.C. § 1411 (1976) ("[e]ntitlements and allocations").
" See id. § 1412 (1976) ("[e]ligibility requirements").
" See id. § 1412(5)(b). EAHCA funding presupposes that the states have established:
procedures to assure that, to the maximum extent appropriate, handicapped
children, including children in public or private institutions or other care facili-
ties, are educated with children who are not handicapped, and that special
classes, separate schooling, or other removal of handicapped children from the
regular educational environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the
handicap is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary
aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily ....
Id. (emphasis added); see Concerned Parents v. Board of Educ., 629 F.2d 751, 754 (2d Cir.
1980). Notably, Senator Stafford, one of the authors of the EAHCA, has written that the
best way to teach handicapped children the adaptive skills which are necessary to compete
in society is to provide an education in as normal an environment as possible. Stafford,
supra note 90, at 76.
Normalization as a goal of special education is not a recent innovation of the EAHCA.
The concept was addressed in an article by M. Reynolds in 1962, A Framework for Consid-
ering Some Issues in Special Education, in which it was stated:
The prevailing view is that normal home and school life should be preserved if at
all possible. When a special placement is necessary to provide suitable care or
education, it should be no more "special" than necessary .... [C]hildren should
be placed in programs of no more special character than absolutely necessary.
There should be continuing assessment of children in special programs with a view
toward returning them to ordinary environments as soon as feasible.
Dybwad, supra note 82, at 87.
- 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1), (2)(B) (1976). As defined within the EAHCA, "[t]he term 'hand-
icapped children' means mentally retarded, hard of hearing, deaf, speech impaired, visually
handicapped, seriously emotionally disturbed, orthopedically impaired, or other health im-
paired children, or children with specific learning disabilities, who by reason thereof require
special education and related services." Id. § 1401(1).
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ies will be used only for approved special education programs.91
Additionally, local state officials must ensure that all children in
need of special services will be "identified, located, and evalu-
ated""9 in a timely manner.10
0
Identification, as required by the Act,10 is the first step in the
process used to determine which children might need special ser-
vices. Department of Education regulations provide that once a
child has been identified as a possible special education candidate,
a full-scale assessment and evaluation must be conducted. 0 2 This
evaluation, consisting of a multifaceted battery of tests, 03 is to be
performed by a multidisciplinary team (MDT). °'0 Although the
regulations do not specifically identify all parties who should serve
on the team,10 5 they do require that at least one member of the
MDT have a knowledge of the suspected handicapping condi-
tion.10  Based upon the child's evaluation, the MDT determines
the student's eligibility for special education. 107 Although the team
may discuss placement options, no placement into a special pro-
gram is made by the MDT.10
98 Id. § 1413(a).
90 Id. § 1414(a)(1)(A).
100 Id. § 1414(a)(1)(D).
201 Id. § 1414(a)(1)(A). Identification is the means employed by the EAHCA to deter-
mine which students need special education. Id. § 1412(2)(c). Significantly, the mere identi-
fication of a student as one eligible for testing does not, without more, establish that the
student is handicapped. Frederick L. v. Thomas, 557 F.2d 373, 384-85 (3d Cir. 1977).
102 34 C.F.R. § 300.531 (1981).
101 See id. § 300.532(f). In the past, testing had worked to discriminate against low
income and minority groups. See Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 1211, 1243-45
(E.D.N.Y. 1978), vacated and remanded, 623 F.2d 248 (2d Cir. 1980); Spangler v. Board of
Educ., 311 F. Supp. 501, 519-20 (C.D. Cal. 1970); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 407
(D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Aware of the
potential for misuse of test results and concerned about the possibility of misclassification,
Congress formulated stringent and comprehensive testing procedures. See S. REP. No. 168,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 27-29, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1425, 1450-52;
cf. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(C) (1976) (evaluation procedures must be "selected and administered
so as not to be racially or culturally discriminatory").
104 34 C.F.R. § 300.532(e) (1981).
'01 See id. The MDT is comprised of a "group of persons, including at least one teacher
or other specialist with knowledge in the area of suspected disability." Id.
106 Id.
107 See id. § 300.531.
10" The placement decision is not made by the evaluation team. Rather, the MDT
merely determines whether a child is handicapped. If the child is handicapped, an IEP team
will construct an educational program for the child. The IEP educational program will,
among other things, dictate where the child will be placed. Compare 34 C.F.R. § 300.532
(1981) (evaluation procedures) with 34 C.F.R. § 300.533 (1981) (placement procedures).
1981]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:81
Once eligibility has been established, the child's individualized
education program (IEP) is developed.109 The IEP provides the
blueprint for the administration of the educational program by de-
fining the type of special education and related services necessi-
tated by the child's handicap. 110 This individualized educational
plan must be finalized prior to any placement into a special educa-
tion program.1
A critical part of the education procedure, the IEP is a pro-
cess 11 2 as well as a written document. 13 As a "process," the IEP
involves negotiations between the child's parents and the school
district.1 14 These negotiations help define the special educational
needs of the child. 11 5 The culmination of the IEP "process" is the
written IEP document, which is both a management tool for moni-
09 34 C.F.R. § 300.533(b) (1981).
10 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19)(C) (1976).
34 C.F.R. § 300.342(b)(1) (1981). The Department of Education, in interpreting the
IEP requirements under the EAHCA has stated that
[t]he appropriate placement for a given handicapped child cannot be determined
until after decisions have been made about what the child's needs are and what
will be provided. Since these decisions are made at the IEP meeting, it would not
be permissible to first place the child and then develop the IEP. Therefore, the
IEP must be developed before placement.
46 Fed. Reg. 5460, 5464 (1981).
... 46 Fed. Reg. 5460, 5462 (1981). The process by which an IEP is developed is an
integral part in the system created by the EAHCA. See Kaye & Aserlind, The IEP: The
Ultimate Process, 13 J. SPECIAL EDUC. 137, 141-42 (1979). This process consists of a series of
meetings of the parties concerned with the education of the handicapped child. 34 C.F.R. §§
300.343, 300.344 (1981). The importance of a joint development of a program by the neces-
sary participants is made clear by the Department of Education's statement of the purpose
of the IEP:
There are two main parts of the IEP requirement, as described in the Act and
regulations: (1) The IEP meeting(s), at which parents and school personnel jointly
make decisions about a handicapped child's educational program, and (2) the IEP
document itself, which is a written record of the decisions reached at the meeting.
46 Fed. Reg. 5460, 5462 (1981).
113 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19) (1976); 34 C.F.R. § 300.340 (1981). While the IEP process ulti-
mately results in a written document defining the educational system to be employed, the
document is not a contract. When the EAHCA was first enacted, however, educators feared
that the failure of a child to reach the goals set for him in the IEP would be viewed as proof
of the inadequacy of the instruction provided by the teacher. See Weatherly & Lipsky,
Street-Level Bureaucrats and Institutional Innovation: Implementing Special-Education
Reform, 47 HARv. EDUc. REV. 171, 190-97 (1977). This fear led to the development of IEPs
which were couched in the most general terms or which set forth goals which were easily
attainable. Id. The regulations incorporated pursuant to the EAHCA alleviated the fears of
educators and teachers by explicitly stating that teachers were not to be held accountable
for failure to achieve the specific goals set forth in the the IEP. 34 C.F.R. § 300.349 (1981).
114 See 46 Fed. Reg. 5460, 5462 (1981).
115 Id.
HANDICAPPED CHILDREN
toring the effectiveness of the educational plan11 and a binding
commitment that the plan as agreed upon will be implemented. 117
The IEP process begins with a meeting scheduled within 30
days of the eligibility determination by the MDT.1 ' A representa-
tive of the school district,119 the child's teacher, 120 and a parent of
the child must attend the IEP meeting. 21 Once the participants at
the meeting reach an agreement regarding the extent of the child's
educational impairment, the parties draft the written IEP. Speci-
fied within this document are (1) the annual objectives to be
achieved in the course of ameliorating the adverse effect of the
child's impairment, 2 2 and (2) the special education and related
services deemed necessary to achieve these objectives. 23
Of course, the written IEP serves as the basis for the educa-
tional placement of the child, and the special education require-
ments specified within the IEP document would appear to dictate
a placement decision. 2 " If, however, the placement established by
the IEP does not meet the parties' approval, the educational rights
of the child as set forth in the EAHCA are safeguarded by the
right to due process. Notably, the EAHCA mandates that each
participating state must establish due process procedures to ensure
that an appropriate educational program is provided to handi-
16 See 121 CONG. REc. 19,484 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Randolph).
117 46 Fed. Reg. 5460, 5462 (1981).
118 34 C.F.R. § 300.343(c) (1981).
11 Id. § 300.344(1). The representative of the school district must be "qualified to pro-
vide, or supervise" special education. Id.
120 Id. § 300.344(2). Senator Stafford has stressed the importance of the presence of the
child's teacher at the IEP conference, noting that such participation would avail the teacher
of valuable information about the child's handicap. 121 CONG. REC. 19,483 (1975) (remarks
of Sen. Stafford).
121 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.344(3) & 300.345 (1981). It is clear that the Department of Educa-
tion deems parent participation in the IEP process to be crucial. Indeed, the Department's
regulations go so far as to provide that "[iff neither parent can attend [the IEP meeting],
the public agency shall use other methods to insure parent participation, including individ-
ual or conference telephone calls." Id. § 300.345(c).
122 Pursuant to the EAHCA, all IEPs must include annual goals and short-term instruc-
tional objectives. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19)(B) (1976); 34 C.F.R. § 300.346(b) (1981). The annual
goals and objectives are determined with reference to the diagnosis of the student's capabili-
ties and needs. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19) (1976). The IEPs also provide a means by which to
measure yearly progress. Id. § 1401(19)(E); 34 C.F.R. § 300.346(e) (1981); E. CRANDALL, IM-
PLEMENTATION OF THE INDIVIDUALIZED EDUCATION PROGRAM, A TEACHER'S PERSPECTIVE 19
(1979).
123 46 Fed. Reg. 5460, 5471 (1981).
124 See id. at 5464.
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capped children. 12 5 Accordingly, prior to identification, evaluation,
or any change in an educational program, the handicapped stu-
dent's parents must be afforded an opportunity to present their
objections. 128 Should such procedures prove unsatisfactory, the ag-
grieved parties are entitled to a due process hearing, 27 with leave
for either party to appeal to the state's education agency, 28 and
then to a federal district court.129
NEW YORK STATE GUIDELINES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE IEP
Article 89 of the New York Education Law230 and the regula-
tions of the State Education Department govern the rights of
125 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1976); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.500-300.541 (1981).
12 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(E) (1976).
127 Id. § 1415(b)(2); 34 C.F.R. § 300.506 (1981).
128 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c) (1976); 34 C.F.R. § 300.510 (1981).
29 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1976); 34 C.F.R. § 300.512 (1981). Before appealing to a fed-
eral district court, the appellant must exhaust all administrative remedies. 20 U.S.C. §
1415(e)(2) (1976). Furthermore, absent an agreement by the school and parents to the con-
trary, the child must remain in his current placement throughout the course of administra-
tive and judicial proceedings. Id. § 1415(e)(3); 34 C.F.R. § 300.513 (1981); see Stemple v.
Board of Educ., 623 F.2d 893, 897-98 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1348 (1981).
The court in Stemple found a duty owed by the parents to keep the child in her current
placement while litigating any issues regarding her program. 623 F.2d at 897-98. Moreover,
the court stated that should the parents decide to remove the child from the current school
placement and place the child in another setting, the school would not be liable for reim-
bursement of the child's tuition. Id. at 898.
This presumptive preservation of the status quo while contesting a change in placement
is consistent with much of American law. Id. It is also suggested that the maintenance of the
status quo is consistent with the philosophy of the EAHCA which strongly emphasizes the
need for the child to be placed in the least restrictive environment possible. See 20 U.S.C. §
1412(5)(B) (1976).
130 N.Y. EDUc. LAW §§ 4401-4409 (McKinney 1981), as amended by Ch. 853, [1976]
N.Y. Laws 1709 (McKinney). The legislative history of the 1976 amendment to the Educa-
tion Law indicates that it was developed in part to satisfy the eligibility requirements of the
EAHCA. See Official Memoranda to Senate 9470-A, N.Y. Legislative Record and Index 5778
(1976); In re J.F., 91 Misc. 2d 445, 448, 398 N.Y.S.2d 125, 126 (Family Ct. Queens County
1977). Prior to the enactment of the amendment, the laws governing education for the hand-
icapped in New York were confused and inconsistent. In re Warren A., 53 App. Div. 2d 400,
402, 385 N.Y.S.2d 590, 591 (2d Dep't 1976); In re Leitner, 40 App. Div. 2d 38, 42, 337
N.Y.S.2d 267, 272 (2d Dep't 1972); see In re Daber, 71 Misc. 2d 303, 303, 335 N.Y.S.2d 947,
948 (Family Ct. Queens County 1972). Confusion was engendered because the Family Court
Act and the Education Law, both applicable to the education of handicapped children, con-
tained inconsistent definitions of the term "handicap." Compare Education Law, ch. 786, §
4401(2) [1967] N.Y. Laws 2117 (repealed ch. 853, § 2 [1976] N.Y. Laws 1709 (McKinney))
with Family Court Act, ch. 686, § 232(b) [1962] N.Y. Laws 3060 (repealed ch. 853 § 4 [1976]
N.Y. Laws 1719 (McKinney)). Additional inconsistencies ensued because six different agen-
cies shared responsibility for the education of certain handicapped children. Comment, Ed-
ucating New York's Handicapped Children, 43 ALB. L. REv. 95, 96-97 (1978).
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handicapped children in New York State.""1 Pursuant to these
laws, the Board of Education of each school district is responsible
for ensuring that a free and appropriate education is provided to
all handicapped children residing within the district." 2 A Commit-
tee on the Handicapped (COH) assists the district in determining
the proper educational program.3 s In furtherance of this goal, the
COH must identify handicapped children s1 and "review and eval-
uate all relevant information" concerning such children.3 5 Upon
identification and evaluation, the COH must recommend an "ap-
propriate educational" placement to the school board and to the
child's parents.138
Recent amendments to the identification, evaluation, program
development, and placement regulations '37 provide a comprehen-
sive definition of the evaluation process and attempt to comport
New York law with federal requirements.138 The amendments af-
fect several procedures impacting upon special education. First,
they establish a systematic process for the referral of children
thought to be handicapped.139 Under the guidelines of the amend-
1 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 4403(3) (McKinney 1981). The Commissioner of Education is
charged with formulating the rules and regulations concerning the identification of handi-
capped children, id. § 4402(1)(a), and the remediation of the needs of such children. See id.
§§ 207, 305(18), 4403(3). Such rules and regulations as may be promulgated must be ap-
proved by the Board of Regents. See id. §§ 207, 4402(1)(a).
132 See N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 3202(1), 4401(1) (McKinney 1981).
33 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 4402(1)(b)(1) (McKinney 1981). The COH is "composed of at
least a school psychologist, a teacher or administrator of special education, a school physi-
cian, a parent of a handicapped child residing in the school district... and such other
persons as the board of education or the board of trustees shall designate." Id. See NEW
YORK STATE EDUCATIONAL DEPARTMENT, GUIDELINES FOR CARRYING OUT THE REsPONSIBILI-
TIES OF THE CoMMITTEE ON THE HANDICAPPED 4 (1978) [hereinafter cited as COH HANDBOOK].
234 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 4402(1)(b)(2) (McKinney 1981).
2S Id. § 4402(1)(b)(3)(a). Pertinent information includes such "evaluations and exami-
nations as necessary to ascertain the physical, mental, emotional and cultural-educational
factors which may contribute to the handicapping condition, and all other school data which
bear on the child's progress." Id. (emphasis added).
136 Id. § 4402(1)(b)(3)(b); see [1981] 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 200.4(c). An appropriate placement
is determined by developing an educational program designed to meet the needs of the indi-
vidual student. In re Board of Educ., 18 N.Y. Dep't Ed. R. 183, 185 (1978).
137 Letter from Robert R. Spillane, Deputy Commissioner of Education, to Organiza-
tions and Individuals Concerned About Regulations of Education of Children with Handi-
capping Conditions (April 1981). The amended regulations were adopted by the Board of
Regents on April 24, 1981. Id. They are to become effective July 1, 1982. Id.
138 N.Y. STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, EDUCATION OF CHILDREN WITH HANDICAPPING
CONDrrIONs, A REVISION OF REGULATIONS ES 3.15 (Jan. 1981) [hereinafter cited as REVISION
OF REGULATIONS].
139 See 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 200.4(a) (effective July 1, 1982). Before the amended regulations
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ment, the COH, upon referral, must notify the parents of a sus-
pected handicapped child that a special education evaluation is
being sought,140 and must obtain parental consent for the evalua-
tion.141 If consent is withheld, the parents are extended an oppor-
tunity to participate in an informal conference to discuss the ne-
cessity for a diagnostic evaluation. 42  Notably, as under the
preexisting regulations, the school district may determine the
child's need for a diagnostic evaluation in the absence of parental
consent.
1 43
Second, the new regulations provide detailed and comprehen-
sive mechanisms to ensure that the evaluation is nondiscrimina-
were adopted, there was no systematic method of referral. See REVISION OF REGULATIONS,
supra note 138, at ES 3:8. Since the building administrator was the person usually most
accessible to parents and staff, he was the one to whom referrals usually were made. Id. at
ES 3.9. The new regulations continue this practice but stipulate certain required procedures.
The regulations require that the building administrator, upon receipt of a referral, must
forward it to the COH within 5 days, 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 200.4(a)(3) (effective July 1, 1982), and
the COH, in turn, must notify the parent of the receipt of the referral within 5 days. Id. §
200.4(a)(5). While teachers, parents, physicians, judicial officers, and public agencies respon-
sible for the child still are permitted to make referrals, the newly adopted regulations also
allow a child of 18 to refer himself. Id. § 200.4(a)(1)(vi).
140 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 200.5(a) (effective July 1, 1982). A special education evaluation
would include any tests administered to a child to determine the existence of a handicap-
ping condition, but would not include standardized tests which would be invalidated by the
child's handicap. Id. § 200.4(b).
14' The referral notice, sent to the parent by the COH, must include a description of
the proposed evaluation and must advise the parents of the purpose of the evaluation. Id. §
200.5(a)(1)(i).
142 Id. § 200.5(a)(1)(ii).
143 Under the former regulations, if a parent did not grant consent for an evaluation,
the principal of the school could hold an informal conference to which the parent was in-
vited. [1981] 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 200.5(a)(2). After the conference, the principal would decide
whether there was a sufficient basis for continuing with an evaluation. Id. § 200.4(a)(2)(ii). If
the parent did not attend the informal conference, the district could initiate an impartial
hearing to determine the necessity for an evaluation. Id. § 200.5(a)(2)(iii).
The new regulations, as originally proposed, did not provide for this procedure. See
REVISION OF REGULATIONS, supra note 138, at ES 3.29-3.88. The absence of this option could
be deleterious, however, since it would mean that handicapped children would not be given
a special education except as provided through the recommendation of the COH and the
subsequently developed IEP. Thus, a parent who refused to allow the district to evaluate a
child with a suspected handicap could have prevented needed educational services from be-
ing extended to the child. Although it is true that the success of any special education pro-
gram depends largely upon the parental support it is given, a method must be available to
help those children whose parents are unwilling or unable to accept the existence of their
child's handicap. Fortunately, the new regulations, as adopted, have reaffirmed the power of
the Board of Education to hold an informal conference and, if necessary, to initiate an im-
partial hearing to determine the need for an evaluation of a child. See 8 N.Y.C.R.R. §
200.5(a)(1)(ii) (effective July 1, 1982).
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tory and is administered validly. These provisions seek to guaran-
tee an accurate assessment of the impairment's impact upon the
child's education."
Third, the new regulations change the options available to the
COH when determining placement of a handicapped child.145 In an
attempt to ensure that the child's placement is based upon his
needs rather than upon the handicapping condition, the new regu-
lations have deleted the former requirements for the grouping of
children according to their identified handicap.1 46 While the em-
phasis in placement still is upon homogeneous grouping, the chil-
dren are grouped according to the type of remediation needed as
opposed to the type of handicap exhibited. 147
Fourth, the amended regulations make substantial changes in
the IEP process which is initiated upon the completion of the
child's diagnostic evaluation. Ratifying a practice employed by
" See 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 200.4(b) (effective July 1, 1982). An important addition to the
evaluation procedure is the requirement that the evaluation include an observation of the
child in his current educational setting. Id. § 200.4(b)(2)(vii). A personal interview with the
child is not required pursuant to the new regulations. See id. But see Lora v. Board of
Educ., 456 F. Supp. 1211, 1235 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), vacated and remanded, 623 F.2d 248 (2d
Cir. 1980).
14 Compare [1981] 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 200.4(c), (e) with 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 200.6(e), (f) (effec-
tive July 1, 1982).
46 The proper classification of a handicapped child was viewed as essential for the de-
velopment of an appropriate program. See In re Joan & James M., 18 N.Y. Dep't Ed. R. 49,
49 (1978). Special education classes formerly were defined by the handicapping conditions
that the members of the class exhibited. [1981] 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 200.4(c). Under the new
regulations, however, a special class may comprise students of the same handicapping condi-
tion or "pupils grouped together for instructional needs rather than by handicapping condi-
tion." 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 200.6(0 (effective July 1, 1982). Classifications of students' handicap-
ping conditions, however, are still very important. For instance, when a child's IEP is
challenged, the hearing officer must have a clear understanding of the child's handicap in
order to determine the appropriateness of the educational program. In re Charles & Isabella
M., 18 N.Y. Dep't Ed. R. 158, 160 (1978). Nevertheless, while the etiology of the handicap is
a factor in classification, In re Diane B., 17 N.Y. Dep't Ed. R. 471, 472 (1978), the classifica-
tion is primarily based upon the child's needs. See In re James S., 18 N.Y. Dep't Ed. R. 25,
26 (1978). Therefore, although a child's test results may indicate a deficiency in intellectual
capacity, the child may not be classified as mentally retarded unless an inability to benefit
from regular education is also demonstrated. In re Handicapped Child, 18 N.Y. Dep't Ed. R.
496, 500 (1979).
14, 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 200.6(0 (effective July 1, 1982). The new regulations have expanded
upon the theory that placement should be determined in accordance with a child's individ-
ual needs, not the label of his handicap. The regulations "will allow for children to be better
served within the special education programs and provide districts the necessary flexibility
to meet pupil needs without being inhibited by arbitrary grouping requirements." REvisIoN
OF REGULATONS, supra note 138, at ES 3.11.
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many districts in the state,148 the regulations have divided the de-
velopment of the IEP process into two phases. 149 During the first
phase of the IEP, the COH classifies the child's handicapping con-
dition and supplies a written program and placement recommen-
dation to the board of education and to the parents of the child.150
The COH recommendation indicates the present level of the stu-
dent's educational development, the annual goals of the recom-
mended corrective program, and any services needed to implement
the program.151 If the parents fail to consent to the proposed cor-
rective program within 30 days following notice, or if they object to
the COH recommendation, a formal impartial hearing may be re-
quested in writing. 52 When no parental objection is raised, the
board must act upon the recommendation.1 53 Of course, any
changes made in implementing the recommendation are subject,
upon parental request, to a hearing.'54
148 See REVISION OF REGULATIONS, supra note 138, at ES 3.6 (new regulations adopt
procedures used in "'pilot' school districts throughout the State").
149 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 200.4(c) & (e) (effective July 1, 1982). Prior to the recent amend-
ment, the New York regulations provided that the IEP should include the five items stipu-
lated by the federal regulations. See [1981] 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 200.4(g)(1). These items were:
(i) a statement of the present levels of educational performance .. ;
(ii) a statement of annual goals, including short-term instructional goals;
(iii) a statement of the specific educational services... to be provided... and
the extent to which the pupil will be able to participate in regular education
programs;
(iv) the projected date for initiation, and anticipated duration, of such services;
(v) appropriate objective criteria and evaluation procedures and schedules for de-
termining, on at least an annual basis, whether the instructional objectives are
being achieved.
Id. This IEP was to be developed at a planning conference of the IEP team at the time the
child entered the program. Id. § 200.4(g)(2). Such a procedure was in line with that adopted
by Congress, namely, the establishment of the IEP process as a unit to be developed prior to
the educational placement of a handicapped child. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19) (1976). The
New York regulations prior to 1981 nominally endorsed this procedure. Nonetheless, the
recent division of the IEP process into two parts, each completed by different persons, was
encouraged by the Education Department. See COH HANDBOOK, supra note 133, at 4-5;
N.Y. STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, OFFICE FOR EDUCATION OF CHILDREN WITH HANDICAP-
PING CONDITIONS, SERVING THE LEARNING DISABLED CHILD IN NEW YORK STATE 13-14. The
newly adopted regulations ratify this procedure. See 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 200.4(c) & (e) (effective
July 1, 1982); REVISION OF REGULATIONS, supra note 138, at 3.10.
:50 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 200.5(b) (effective July 1, 1982).
151 Id. § 200.4(c)(2)(ii), (vi) & (vii).
Id. § 200.5(c) (effective July 1, 1982).
153 Id.
14 The time frame for approving the COH placement recommendation has been
changed by the 1981 regulations. Prior to the implementation of the amended regulations,
the board of education was required to place a child within 60 days of receipt of the COH
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The second phase of the JEP process takes place after the
child has entered the board-approved special education program.155
During this phase, a planning conference is held in order to de-
velop short-term instructional objectives and evaluation criteria for
the child.1 5e The parents of the child, the child's teacher, and a
representative of the school district participate in the development
of these instructional goals.1 57
Problems Associated with New York's Bifurcated IEP Process
Although several of the amendments outlined above appear to
be in conformity with EAHCA mandates, it is submitted that the
adoption of a two-phased IEP is ill advised.
Significantly, New York's bifurcated IEP excludes the im-
paired child's parent and teacher from Phase I, a crucial segment
of the IEP process. 158 Surely, it is the teacher, with a knowledge of
teaching strategies and of the impaired child's classroom perform-
ance, who can provide critical input into the Phase I placement
decision. 5 1 In addition, it is the parent of an impaired child who
evaluation, although the board was to determine the eligibility and classification of the sub-
ject child within 30 days. [1981] 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 200.5(d); see In re Board of Educ., 18 N.Y.
Dep't Ed. R. 353, 354 (1978); In re Jacqueline D., 18 N.Y. Dep't Ed. R. 90, 92 (1978). The
recently enacted regulations provide that the board must make all its determinations re-
garding eligibility, classification, and placement within the second 30-day period. See 8
N.Y.C.R.R. § 200.4(d) (effective July 1, 1982); see REvisION OF REGULATMONs, supra note 138,
at ES 3.10.
15 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 200.4(e) (effective July 1, 1982).
156 Id.
'15 Id. § 200.4(e)(2).
158 See id, § 200.4(c); see note 133 and accompanying text supra. Pursuant to N.Y.
EDUC. LAw § 4402(1), the COH must notify the parents of receipt of a referral of their child,
and must request permission to evaluate the child. This notice must advise the parent of his
opportunity to "address the committee, either in person or in writing, on the propriety of
any [subsequent] recommendation by the committee as to the classification, program or
placement of the pupil." 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 200.5(a)(1)(i) (effective July 1, 1982). Parents, how-
ever, are not entitled to written notice of the date on which the COH will discuss and evalu-
ate the educational information relevant to their child. In re Richard W. & Joyce W., 18
N.Y. Dep't of Ed. R. 407, 411 (1979). At this stage of the process, procedural protections do
not attach because the parties are not viewed as adversaries. In re Michael A., 16 N.Y. Dep't
of Ed. R. 18, 21 (1976). Therefore, although the parents may have relevant and important
information regarding their child's educational needs, it appears that Phase I decisions may
be made without such input.
159 Significantly, one commentator has noted that:
The teacher(s) of the handicapped child in question must also be included on any
team charged with the responsibility of formulating an individualized education
program. In many ways, the teacher(s) (that is, the person(s) who has or will be
providing direct instruction to the child) included on the IEP team is its most
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:81
most vigorously would advocate that child's best interests.16 0 In-
deed, neither the school administrator nor the special education
teacher, both parties to Phase I, has the knowledge required to
provide information regarding the activities conducted in the regu-
lar classroom, nor a parent's desire to obtain the most effective ed-
ucation for his child.
It is submitted, moreover, that the parents and teacher of a
handicapped child are in the best position to know those services
and aids which most effectively would provide the compensatory
skills necessary to remediate specific impairments.161 Similarly,
New York's bifurcated IEP process could cause skills and services,
chosen as they are by the COH, e2 to be selected in accordance
with preconceived educational criteria, not in accordance with the
unique needs of an impaired child." 8 Because the mainstreaming
of a handicapped child may create a stressful situation for the reg-
ular classroom teacher, that teacher must be permitted an oppor-
tunity to specify those teaching aids and special services needed to
effect integration.' Otherwise, a negative response by the teacher
important member in that he/she alone is knowledgeable regarding the specific
educational characteristics and needs of the youngster that will serve to mold and
direct the goals, objectives, and services eventually delineated in the IEP.
S. LARSEN & M. POPLIN, supra note 78, at 380 (emphasis in original).
160 See Note, Appropriate Education, supra note 17, at 1110-13.
iei See S. LARSEN & M. POPLIN, supra note 78, at 380-83.
... See 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 200.4(c) (effective July 1, 1982).
105 See Large, supra note 90, at 256.
18 Bensky, Shaw, Gouse, Bates, Dixon & Beane, Public Law 94-142 and Stress: A
Problem for Educators, 47 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 24, 27 (1980). Such tasks as team meet-
ings, paperwork, and monitoring and evaluation of IEP's impose time demands upon the
already burdened teacher which may result in a negative response to the mainstreaming
process. Weatherly & Lipsky, supra note 113, at 189-95. It is suggested that this problem
can be averted. Preparatory courses designed to equip teachers with the skills and methods
necessary to achieve successful integration are essential. Naor & Milgram, Two Preservice
Strategies for Preparing Regular Class Teachers for Mainstreaming, 47 EXcEIONAL CHIL-
DREN 126, 129 (1980). Additional planning time, reduced class size, and the provision of
trained teaching aides should also be considered. Weatherly & Lipsky, supra note 113, at
195-97. It has been suggested that the IEP process itself should be designed to reflect these
teacher needs. C. Davis, Mainstreaming Versus An Appropriate Education ("Use" not
"Abuse" of the IEP) 7-9 (Jan. 1979) (unpublished work distributed to advocates of handi-
capped children). As the IEP must include all the special services that are needed to allow
the child to function successfully,,it must include teacher support services. Id. at 4-8. Of
course, if the TEP process is to reflect such needs, changes in the existing regulations must
be forthcoming. Moreover, a commitment must be made on the part of the State of New
York to encourage school districts to provide the support services the regular classroom
teacher needs.
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to the mainstreaming process may ensue.165
New York's IEP process also excludes parents and teachers
from funding decisions, since it is in Phase I that "scarce educa-
tional resources" are allocated.166 It appears that such an exclu-
sionary practice is possessed of several negative concomitants.
First, because the cost of educating handicapped children is signifi-
cant, school districts might be reluctant to provide for all of the
needs of such children. 67 Second, absent parental participation,
resource allocations are likely to be conditioned upon the etiology
of the handicap, not upon the handicapped student's unique
needs.""8
Finally, it is notable that New York's bifurcated IEP process
permits placement of a handicapped child before the educational
objectives for that child have been defined and accepted.6 9
Clearly, such an approach is in derogation of the EAHCA, which
mandates the maintenance of a handicapped student's educational
status quo until the entire IEP process is completed.' Of course,
the potential consequence of such an approach is an inappropriate
placement decision, for if the parent fails to contest the placement
decision made in Phase I, a subsequent challenge of Phase II edu-
cational objectives will not repeal such placement.' 7 ' Because the
educational objectives complementary to the COH's placement de-
cision cannot unilaterally be implemented if attacked by the par-
ent,17 2 it appears that such an attack would deprive the child of
1'5 See Weatherly & Lipsky, supra note 113, at 189-95.
'"[T]he decision to establish certain educational objectives for handicapped children
profoundly impacts on the allocation of scarce educational resources." Battle v. Pennsylva-
nia, 629 F.2d 269, 278 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3954 (U.S. June 23, 1981).
Educational objectives are determined by the COH during Phase L 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 200.4(c)
(effective July 1, 1982).
167 See Note, Appropriate Education, supra note 17, at 1109-10. The school district's
"assessment of the child will tend to be based on the district's existing resources, rather
than on the specific needs of the child." Large, supra note 90, at 256.
169 See Large, supra note 90, at 256.
169 See 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 200.4(d) (effective July 1, 1982).
170 See note 111 supra.
17 See N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 4404(4) (McKinney 1981); In re Marsha B., 17 N.Y. Dep't of
Ed. R. 394, 397 (1978); In re Albert H., 17 N.Y. Dep't of Ed. R. 171, 173 (1977). If the
parents wish to contest the progran after the recommended placement of their child has
been accepted, the child, nevertheless, will remain placed in the contested situs. It is sug-
gested that this is not the intent of the EAHCA, which awards the parent the right to
contest any part of the IEP, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1) (1976), and mandates that the child
remain in his original placement status "[d]uring the pendency of" litigation. Id. §
1415(e)(3).
172 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 200.5(c) (effective July 1, 1982).
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the administrative and educational support services necessary to
render such placement appropriate.
JUDICIAL TESTS FOR APPROPRIATE EDUCATION
Once a parent assumes an active role in the development of an
IEP, the likelihood of a dispute increases, since the parent's per-
ception of his child's needs may differ from the perceptions and
interests of a school district.173 Although, in the ideal situation, the
parties may settle their differences without resorting to the courts,
judicial involvement sometimes is necessary. While the opposing
parties must marshal the evidence in support of their views, it is
the responsibility of a court, when presented with a dispute, to de-
termine which educational alternative best provides for an appro-
priate education. 174 Unfortunately, however, the EAHCA does not
expressly define "appropriate."1 75 Consequently, the courts have
fashioned various definitions of the term.
In Rowley v. Board of Education,7 6 for example, the Southern
District of New York held that an appropriate education must en-
gender "academic equality.' ' 7 7 In Rowley, the parents of a deaf
child, after exhausting their administrative remedies, brought suit
seeking to have a sign language interpreter placed in their daugh-
ter's classroom. 17 8 Although the plaintiffs' school district had rec-
ommended that the child be placed in a regular class program with
the services of a speech therapist, a tutor for the deaf, and an FM
wireless hearing aid,'79 the child's parents contended that the rec-
17 See Large, supra note 90, at 258.
174 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (1976).
17 See id. § 1401 (definitions).
1" 483 F. Supp. 528 (S.D.N.Y.), afld, 632 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert.
granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3334 (U.S. Nov. 2, 1981) (No. 80-1002). The action originally was
brought against the Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District,
which had denied the plaintiff's request for special services. 483 F. Supp. at 529 & n.1. The
New York State Commissioner of Education, who had upheld the decision of the district,
was joined in the litigation as a necessary party. Id.
' See 483 F. Supp. at 534.
78 Id. at 531. Notably, the plaintiff's parents were both deaf, and upon discovery of
their child's deafness, they raised their child with the use of "total communication," which
is a combination of lip reading, visual cues, and sign language. Id. at 529-30. Although total
communication is a widely accepted method of communication, it is only one of many alter-
natives. See Large, supra note 90, at 229-40. Because experts disagree as to the value of the
"total communication" process, see id. at 236-37, it was not clearly improper for the defen-
dant school district to refuse to place a sign interpreter in Amy Rowley's classroom, see 483
F. Supp. at 529.
179 Rowley v. Board of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528, 531 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 632 F.2d 945 (2d
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ommended services did not rise to the level of an appropriate edu-
cation as required by the EAHCA.' so
Evidence indicated that Amy Rowley was performing above
average academically, notwithstanding the fact that she could only
discriminate slightly more than half of the words spoken by her
teacher. 8 1 It was proven, however, that with the use of a sign lan-
guage interpreter, the child's discrimination was 100% accurate. 1 2
Thus, the plaintiffs contended that the school district's failure to
provide an interpreter resulted in a deficient education. l83 The de-
fendant school district, on the other hand, claimed that since Amy
Rowley was performing above grade level, appropriate educational
services had been supplied.""
Determining that an interpreter was required by the
EAHCA, s5 the court distinguished between an "adequate" and an
"appropriate" education. 88 The court held that, although an edu-
cation may well be "adequate" if viewed with respect to a child's
relative achievement within a class,8 7 the assessment of appropri-
ateness entails a further inquiry, namely, whether such education
will enable a handicapped child to achieve an academic perform-
ance level equal to that obtainable by a nonhandicapped child of
similar initiative, motivation, and intellectual ability.88 Applying
Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3334 (U.S. Nov. 2, 1981) (No. 80-1002).
180 Id. at 529.
181 Id. at 532, 534.
182 Id. at 532.
183 Id. at 535.
284 Id. at 534.
185 Id. at 536.
181 Id. at 534. In determining the constitution of an appropriate education, the Rowley
court noted two extremes. First, the court suggested that "appropriate" could mean ade-
quate, namely, an education which would enable a student to advance each year and eventu-
ally obtain a diploma. Id. Conversely, the court postulated a definition of appropriate edu-
cation which would entail guaranteeing each handicapped child an education designed to
realize his maximum potential. Id.; see notes 198 & 199 and accompanying text infra. The
court, however, rejected both of these premises in light of the judicial history of the
EAHCA. Id.
187 483 F. Supp. at 534.
I" Id. The Rowley court concluded that the right to education cases, upon which the
EAHCA was based, dictated that an appropriate education would provide "each handi-
capped child ... an opportunity to achieve his full potential commensurate with the oppor-
tunity provided to other children." Id. (citing Appropriate Education, supra note 17, at
1125-26); see Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279,
296-97 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 876 (D.D.C. 1972). Sup-
port for this definition of an appropriate education may be found in the regulations adopted
pursuant to section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87
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this "academic equality" test, the Rowley court concluded that
since Amy Rowley's educational program "would be more 'appro-
priate' with than without an interpreter," her program was
unacceptable. 189
Another definition of "appropriate education" was promul-
gated by the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Armstrong v.
Kline.1 90 In Kline, an action was brought on behalf of all severely
and profoundly retarded children and all severely and emotionally
disturbed children,191 challenging a state public policy which lim-
ited public education to a 180-day schedule.192 In support of their
contention that the state must provide the education necessary for
each child to reach his maximum potential, the plaintiffs relied
upon the EAHCA's definition of special education as "'specially
designed instruction . . . to meet the unique needs of a handi-
capped child.' "193 The plaintiffs' evidence showed that the inter-
ruption in instruction caused by a summer vacation resulted in a
significant loss of skills which could only be regained by extended
Stat. 394 (1973) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)). "[A]ppropriate educa-
tion is the provision of regular or special education and related aids and services that...
are designed to meet individual educational needs of handicapped persons as adequately as
the needs of nonhandicapped are met.... ." 45 C.F.R. § 84.33(b) (1980); accord Haggerty &
Sachs, supra note 8, at 986. But see Rowley v. Board of Educ., 632 F.2d 945, 951-52 (2d Cir.
1980) (Mansfield, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3334 (U.S. Nov. 2, 1981) (No.
80-1002). Judge Mansfield, dissenting from the Second Circuit's affirmance of the district
court's academic equality test, stated:
Unaware of the Act's definition and using a definition found in a regulation
promulgated under a different Act for a different purpose [section 504 of the Re-
habilitation Act of 1973], Judge Broderick formulated a new standard-"that each
handicapped child be given an opportunity to achieve his full potential commen-
surate with the opportunity provided to other children"-which he borrowed from
a law review note .... No support for this definition is to be found in the Act, its
legislative history, or in regulations promulgated thereunder. Had Congress in-
tended such a definition it would have enacted it.
632 F.2d at 952 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
19 Rowley v. Board of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528, 536 (S.D.N.Y.), afl'd, 632 F.2d 945 (2d
Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3334 (U.S. Nov. 2, 1981) (No. 80-1002).
The test used in Rowley first was enunciated in a Harvard Law Review article. See Note,
Appropriate Education, supra note 17, at 1126.
190 476 F. Supp. 583 (E.D. Pa. 1979), aff'd on other grounds sub nom., Battle v. Penn-
sylvania, 629 F.2d 269 (3d. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3954 (U.S. June 23, 1981).
191 The certified class was defined as "[a]ll handicapped school aged persons in the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania who require or who may require a program of special edu-
cation and related services in excess of 180 days per year and the parents or guardians of
such persons." 476 F. Supp. at 586.
192 Id. at 585.
191 Id. at 603 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1401(16) (1976)) (emphasis added by court).
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periods of relearning the following year."' Thus, the plaintiffs as-
serted that the extended vacation period imposed by the 180-day
requirement prevented their class from deriving the fullest benefit
possible from their educational program.195 The defendants coun-
tered that the EAHCA did not require this level of education and
asserted that only those needs which prevented any benefit from
being received from the educational program must be re-
mediated. 198 Since there was no proof that the regression which oc-
curred in the summer completely nullified the educational gains
made during the school term, the defendants argued that the
plaintiffs did benefit from the existing program.97
Looking to the legislative and judicial history of the
EAHCA,195 the Kline court found that the educational programs
required by the Act must provide for maximum self-sufficiency." 9
Since adherence to the 180-day rule prevented handicapped chil-
dren from achieving self-sufficiency, the court held that the Act
had been violated. 00
1. Evaluation of Rowley and Kline Tests
It is submitted that the Rowley academic equality test, which
entails a comparison of the potential academic achievements of
handicapped and nonhandicapped students of similar intellectual
abilities,201 often is inapposite. For instance, the Rowley standard
presupposes the existence of testing procedures which accurately
can determine the learning potential of a handicapped child.202
19 476 F. Supp. at 593-600.
111 Id. at 592.
18 Id. at 603.
19 Id. at 592.
'' Id. at 601-05. The Kline court stated that the PARC decision, see notes 37-51 and
accompanying text supra, was premised, in part, upon the belief that most handicapped
children are capable of achieving self-sufficiency and independence from institutional care.
Armstrong v. Kline, 476 F. Supp. 583, 603 (E.D. Pa. 1979), aff'd on other grounds sub nom.
Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3954 (U.S.
June 23, 1981) (No. 80-1002). The court further observed that a principal objective of the
EAHCA was to promote the self-sufficiency of handicapped children, and consequently, to
enable them to contribute to society rather than burden the public finances. 476 F. Supp. at
604; see S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Seass. 9, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1425, 1433.
19 476 F. Supp. at 600.
200 Id. at 605.
201 See note 188 and accompanying text supra.
202 In Rowley, see notes 176-189 and accompanying text supra, it was possible to deter-
mine the effect of the handicap on the plaintiff by comparing the scores of tests given to her
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Many handicapped children, however, have unique problems which
would invalidate such tests or impede their proper administra-
tion.203 Moreover, while the Rowley test may have some validity
when the required comparison can be made, as in the case of a
sensory impairment which can be compensated for, it is evident
that such an approach is inadequate when the handicap is an intel-
lectual impairment. Clearly, there is no nonhandicapped peer with
whom to compare the academic potential of a mentally retarded
child. Hence, academic equality can neither be measured nor
achieved.0 4
Similarly, the Kline court's self-sufficiency test205 also is prob-
lematic. By requiring the maximization of self-sufficiency, the
court has established a specific level of educational achievement
for handicapped children. Surely, such an objective is not contem-
plated by the EAHCA, which mandates only the remediation of
the affect of a child's handicap upon his educable potential so that
he may avail himself of the same educational opportunities pro-
vided to nonhandicapped students. 0 6 Significantly, on appeal of
by sign with those administered orally. Rowley v. Board of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528, 534
(S.D.N.Y.), afl'd, 632 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3334
(U.S. Nov. 2, 1981) (No. 80-1002). It was also possible to measure the plaintiff's I.Q. because
she was able to interpret signed tests. See 483 F. Supp. at 534.
203 See S. LARSEN & M. POPLIN, supra note 78, at 72-91. "It is axiomatic that as with all
other devices, intelligence tests are influenced by a child's idiosyncratic characteristics, abili-
ties, and deficits." Id. at 82.
204 The author of the Harvard Law Review article which espoused the academic equal-
ity test conceded the difficulty of comparing nonhandicapped to handicapped children when
the handicapping condition involved an intellectual impairment. See Note, Appropriate Ed-
ucation, supra note 17, at 1126. In circumvention of such difficulty, the commentator sug-
gested other modes of equality, including "an equitable sharing of educational resources."
Id. It is submitted, however, that such a comparison is in derogation of the EAHCA.
Clearly, for example, an equitable sharing of resources would not permit of the provision of
"specially designed instruction, at no cost to parents or guardians, to meet the unique needs
of a handicapped child, including classroom instruction, instruction in physical education,
home instruction, and instruction in hospitals and institutions." 20 U.S.C. § 1401(16) (1976).
Similarly, educational resources could not equitably be shared if, as mandated by the
EAHCA, handicapped children were to receive such specialized, and costly, aid as "speech
pathology and audiology, psychological services, physical and occupational therapy, recrea-
tion, and medical and counseling services." Id. § 1401(17).
215 Armstrong v. Kline, 476 F. Supp. 583, 603-04 (E.D. Pa. 1976), afl'd on other grounds
sub nom. Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3954
(U.S. June 23, 1981).
201 The EAHCA is premised upon the "belief that the Congress must take a more active
role under its responsibility for equal protection of the laws to guarantee that handicapped
children are provided equal educational opportunity." S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
9, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1425, 1433. Interestingly, the author of
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the Kline decision, the Third Circuit dismissed the district court's
self-sufficiency test, reasoning that neither the EAHCA nor the
legislative history of the Act mandated the maximization of the
self-sufficiency of handicapped children.20 7
2. What is an "appropriate" education?
It is suggested that an appropriate education must not be
measured in terms of the degree of skills provided to handicapped
children or by resort to quantitative assessments of academic
achievement. Of course, special education, by definition,, is
designed to meet the educational needs of the handicapped
child.208 Nevertheless, although a child's impairment may have a
direct negative impact upon his realizable academic progress, the
EAHCA does not guarantee any child a specific level of educa-
tional achievement. 20 9 Hence, a determination of "appropriate" ed-
ucational services cannot properly be founded upon a mere assess-
ment of academic need.
Clearly, however, the EAHCA does mandate the provision of
all services and aids necessary to allow a handicapped child to
function in the least restricted environment, 210 that is, in an envi-
ronment which is "extensive enough to permit an individual to be
provided specially designed instruction geared to [his] unique
needs and to be included in as many regular education activities
as feasible."2 1 Notably, a least restricted environment is not dis-
crete, but is a "continuum of placements . . . from least to most
restrictive. '21 2
Note, Appropriate Education, supra note 17, confronted with the conceptual difficulties
associated with the academic equality test espoused therein, suggested that an appropriate
education, for intellectually impaired children, "would require equal opportunity for indi-
vidual development." Id. at 1126-27.
207 Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269, 279 n.11 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49
U.S.L.W. 3954 (U.S. June 23, 1981). According to the Third Circuit, "Armstrong v. Kline
: . . effectively established a specific level of achievement for each individual, i.e., max-
imization of self-sufficiency. This position goes far beyond 'establishing the direction toward
which the programs required by the statute should aim."' 629 F.2d at 279 n.11 (emphasis in
original).
208 See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(16) (1976).
209 See Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773-96 (1975) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1232, 1401,
1405, 1406, 1411-1420, 1453 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
210 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (1976); 34 C.F.R. § 300.132 (1981); see Miller & Miller, supra
note 74, at 5.
S. LARSEN & M. POPLIN, supra note 78, at 312.
212 Id. at 313. The continuum of educational environments, from least to most restric-
1981]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Therefore, the first step toward determining the appropriate-
ness of an educational plan is to assess whether a child is, at all
times, placed in his least restricted environment. Proper place-
ment, however, constitutes only a part of an appropriate education.
Given the range of educational environments and the desirability
of assimilating handicapped children into society,213 it is evident
that an appropriate education is one which offers a process
through which the placement of a child may progress from a more
restrictive milieu to a less restrictive milieu, until the integration
of the child into a regular classroom is obtained. This, of course, is
the process of normalization.2 14
Thus, in assessing whether an educational skill or service is
appropriate, a court must analyze the entire educational process
specified within a handicapped child's IEP. The IEP must provide
for prompt normalization of the child. Moreover, it must provide
the skills and services necessary to effectively integrate the child
into his current placement, and at the same time, provide for his
advancement into a less restrictive placement. In essence, there-
fore, the court must determine (1) whether the child currently is
placed in his least restricted environment, where his unique needs
best can be addressed; (2) whether the skills and services sufficient
to enable a child to avail himself of the educational opportunities
within his placement milieu have been provided (integration); and
(3) whether the skills and services necessary to improve a child's
placement position have been provided (normalization).
Concededly, the aforementioned test is not imbued with abso-
lute guidelines clearly delineating an appropriate educational pro-
gram. Nonetheless, since education in the least restricted environ-
ment is mandated by the EAHCA, and since normalization is the
process whereby successive educational surroundings may become
decreasingly restrictive, it is clear that courts must assess IEP's in
terms of such normalization potential.
CONCLUSION
In light of the federal government's diminishing support for
tive, includes "(1) regular class placement with special assistance; (2) resource rooms; (3)
integrated classrooms; (4) self-contained classrooms; (5) special day schools; and (6) hospi-
tal, home, and residential placement." Id. at 311-12.
213 See S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1425, 1433.
I1 See notes 87 & 96 supra.
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public education programs, it appears that the role of the courts in
preserving the educational rights of handicapped children may
gain increased importance in the years ahead. Significantly, the
President has stated that "the responsibility for education of the
young lies, first and foremost, with parents and then with the state
and local education agencies whose primary role is helping parents
with that task. 21 5 Moreover, the Secretary of the Department of
Education, a department threatened with extinction,210 recently
wrote that he envisions a "limited Federal role" in public educa-
tion, and that state and local governments must bear the primary
responsibility for fashioning public education programs. 17
One need only observe the status of the education of handi-
capped children before the EAHCA was enacted to realize that,
should federal funding be curtailed, the coffers of state and local
governments would be insufficient to meet the needs of handi-
capped children. 28 Hence, it appears that the advocates of these
children increasingly may be forced to resort to the courts to en-
sure the provision of equal educational opportunities. Irrespective
of the circumstances necessitating judicial involvement, it is hoped
that the courts will adopt the goal of normalization as the best
method to ensure the appropriateness of educational programs.
Bruce G. She fler
216 Bell, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1981, § 12 (FaUl Survey of Education), at 65 (quoting
President Reagan).
216 Herndon, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1981, § 12 (Fall Survey of Education), at 65.
217 Bell, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1981, § 12 (Fall Survey of Education), at 65.
218 See note 94 and accompanying text supra.
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